In this episode of Interpreting India, Vijay Gokhale joins Srinath Raghavan to discuss the recent developments in the Indo-Pacific. What is the significance of China’s actions, and how are they being perceived by other countries in the region? What are the implications of the growing U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific? And finally, how are India-China relations being impacted by a deepening partnership between Russia and China?
Over the last few months, the Indo-Pacific has seen a flurry of activity. China launched the Global Security Initiative and its foreign minister Wang Yi embarked on a tour of the Pacific Islands. More significantly, Beijing inked a security agreement with the Solomon Islands that sent shockwaves across the region. Around the same time, the Quad held its second in-person summit in Tokyo, and the United States ushered in a series of regional partnerships including the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum and I2U2. All the while, the war in Ukraine has continued to cast its shadow on the region.
In this episode of Interpreting India, Vijay Gokhale joins Srinath Raghavan to discuss the recent developments in the Indo-Pacific. What is the significance of China’s actions, and how are they being perceived by other countries in the region? What are the implications of the growing U.S.-China competition in the Indo-Pacific? And finally, how are India-China relations being impacted by a deepening partnership between Russia and China?
Episode Contributors
Vijay Gokhale is a non-resident senior fellow at Carnegie India. He retired from the Indian Foreign Service in January 2020 after a diplomatic career that spanned thirty-nine years. He has served as both the foreign secretary of India (from January 2018 to January 2020) and as India’s ambassador to China (from January 2016 to October 2017). He has worked extensively on matters relating to the Indo-Pacific region with a special emphasis on Chinese politics and diplomacy. He is the author of Tiananmen Square: The Making of a Protest and The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India.
Srinath Raghavan is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie India. His primary research focus is on the contemporary and historical aspects of India’s foreign and security policies.
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Srinath
Hello and welcome back to Interpreting India.
Srinath
Even as the world looks hopefully to emerge from the shadow of the pandemic. 2022 has so far been defined by another variant of COVID-19, precarious geopolitical relations, and a rapidly evolving technological landscape.
Srinath
In this season we at Carnegie India are examining many of the challenges and opportunities that India will confront in the coming decade.
Srinath
I'm your host, Srinath Raghavan and this week we are discussing China and the Indo Pacific.
Srinath
Over the past few months, Indo Pacific has seen a flurry of activity.
Srinath
China wants the global security initiative and its foreign minister, Wang Yi, went on tour of the Pacific Islands.
Srinath
More significantly, Beijing concluded a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, which sent shockwaves across the region.
Srinath
Around the same time The QUAD held its second in person Summit in Tokyo and the United States ushered a series of regional partnerships, including the Indo Pacific Economic Forum and I2U2 (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States).
Srinath
All the while, the war in Ukraine has continued to cast its long shadow on the region.
Srinath
In this episode of Interpreting India, we discuss the recent developments in the Indo Pacific and its implications for India.
Srinath
Joining us today is Ambassador Vijay Gokhale.
Srinath
Ambassador Gokhale is a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie, India.
Srinath
He retired from the Indian Foreign Service in January 2020 after a diplomatic career that spanned 39 years.
Srinath
He has served both as the Foreign Secretary of India from January 2018 to January 2020 and as an Indian ambassador to China from January 2016 to October 2017. He has worked extensively on matters relating to the Indo Pacific region with special emphasis on Chinese politics and diplomacy.
Srinath
Ambassador Gokhale is the author of two books, The Tiananmen Square: The Making of a Protest, and The Long Game: How the Chinese Negotiate with India.
Srinath
Ambassador Gokhale welcome to Interpreting India We are delighted to have you with us.
Vijay Gokhale
Thank you, thank you Srinath.
Srinath
I want to start by talking about China's recent outreach in the Indo – Pacific.
Srinath
Now in late May we saw Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi undertaking a 10-day tour of the Pacific Islands.
Srinath
Now, how do we understand China's desire for such an extensive outreach to this part of the world? The Pacific islands?
Vijay Gokhale
Thank you Srinath, let me start by saying that China's outreach to the South Pacific is not that new.
Vijay Gokhale
For a while now, China and Taiwan have been competing with the South Pacific nations on the whole issue of diplomatic recognition and therefore China has been present in the South Pacific in terms of giving economic assistance and help to those countries which slipped, which switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China.
Vijay Gokhale
What is new this time is an effort by the Chinese side to give a security or semi-security dimension to its cooperation with the Pacific Island states.
Vijay Gokhale
Now the Chinese will of course want the rest of the world to believe that this is because of certain developments have taken place in the Indo-Pacific over the last 12 to 18 months (about 1 and a half years).
Vijay Gokhale
Including the activation of the prod at the summit level as well as the new arrangement called outposts between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Vijay Gokhale
But the fact of the matter is Srinath, that for some time now, China has been engaging in a
Diplomacy and politics in the South China Sea and in the Western Pacific, and this diplomacy is aimed at building up its own political relations with these countries while at the same time diluting the system of American alliances because it believes that the continuation of American alliances in the Western Pacific in some way threatens China security.
Vijay Gokhale
Now, of course, moving into the South Pacific in the manner that it did first with the Solomon Islands and then an attempt to get a Pacific Island wide security of quasi security agreement was of course an entirely new level of their presence in the South Pacific.
Vijay Gokhale
But I think this was also a way of pushing back against the QUAD, against the whole idea of the Indo Pacific and in a sense challenging the West to put their money where their mouth is. Because China has launched the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, and it is willing to back this with its own money.
Vijay Gokhale
So, in a sense, what they are trying to do is there the West to match them. Pound for pound or dollar for dollar or renminbi for renminbi and we have to look at what is happening in the South Pacific, or for that matter, even in South Asia. From that perspective, not from the perspective of this being anything new.
Srinath
Sure, you mentioned about the global security initiative that the Chinese have launched and also the Global Development initiative and that these are in essence to be understood within that kind of broader framework.
Srinath
The Chinese had also, if I'm not mistaken talked about a joint development vision and a five-year plan for the region, but that doesn't seem to have made much headway.
Vijay Gokhale
You know this is not the Global security initiative in the global development initiatives are part of a much larger united front tactic or united front strategy by the Chinese to build a body of countries, which in essence stands with China.
Vijay Gokhale
And therefore, forms a security perimeter, which gives some comfort to the Chinese at the time when they feel the Americans are building a containment strategy against them.
Vijay Gokhale
This is not the first time that they have used this strategy. In a sense, in the 1950s, the Bandung Conference and the whole idea of Asian solidarity came, which came from China.
Vijay Gokhale
The concept of Asian solidarity was a united front tactic and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chinese also similarly adopted the United Front tactic against the unipolar power the United States, now the current global security and development initiatives in a sense, are the means by which China hopes that they can counter what they consider to be the hegemonic intentions of the United States in a post COVID situation, where are the two largest countries by far in terms of economy and military power are China and the United States and although the world pretends that we are moving towards multi polarity, in fact these two poles are so large that it might well at least for the next 5 to 10 years be a bipolar world.
Vijay Gokhale
In this context then the GSI and the GDI (Global Development Initiatives) are sort of, the Chinese strategies to build that larger united front in order to ensure that if there is a competition with the United States, there are a sizable number of countries that stand with China in multilateral institutions and even bilaterally.
Srinath
Sure and does this have any specific Implication for India and South Asia, I know we are quite far away from the Pacific islands, but the Indo Pacific is very much our own neighborhood, so whatdoes this mean really?
Vijay Gokhale
For us, I think this is a - these are ideas which have a deep impact in South Asia. My own belief is that after 2010 China entire doctrine in its periphery has changed from homeland defense to meeting the challenges coming towards China in its periphery.
In other words, beyond its homeland and therefore, all the peripheral and proximate regions and states and countries then become a sort of a battleground if it were to be if that was the word, I could use in the event that China has a problem with the United States and South Asia is very much a region abating China it is a proximate or peripheral region.
Vijay Gokhale
Therefore, in that context, the Belt and Road initiative and now the GSI and the GDI have a very serious implication because China is going to put its political, its military, its economic and its cultural capabilities to work its capacities in all these areas to work in order to build stronger relations with these countries so that if there is a challenge to them in any manner, they are have a sort of perimeter wall uh, security wall in which they within which they feel relatively safe. Now what the specific details of the GTI and the GSI are has not been felt up by the Chinese.
Vijay Gokhale
It is like the community for the shared future of mankind, a fuzzy notion, and it is fuzzy simply because it is a tactic or a strategy to separate the West and the rest.
So long as they tell the rest of the world that these initiatives are part of an effort to build the 20th century world in which all of us have a shared a future and therefore, we should all work together and portrays the other side as a small group of countries which are engaging in our politics of the 20th century then China would have achieved its objectives so I don't think the GSI and the GTI at this stage, at least bear a close looking with a with a microscope you won't find much there.
Srinath
Sure, but presumably the countries that China is trying to woo will look for some substantive content behind these slogans I mean, for instance, you take the example of a country like Sri Lanka, which is undergoing so much turmoil I mean, as in when they have a more stable government, surely the government will look to China for certain initiatives etc.,because part of its problem stems with its sort economic relations with China itself. So, is China geared up to actually delivering on some of this?
Vijay Gokhale
Yeah, that's a good question. I think China in any case understands its strategic environments and wherever it has to fulfill those requirements it has put money as well as equipment as well as technology into those countries either as a grant or as a soft loan that was the whole purpose of the
Belt and Road initiative and the GTI and the GSI essentially are spreading the concept at a global level, so I think that strategy and tactic the Chinese have adopted will continue.
Vijay Gokhale
I think the question, however, is whether their current economic situation will allow them to maintain the same level of activity as they had in the 10 years between 2010 and 2020. Now, if I were to go by the latest available data and information and writings on the Chinese my sense is that they are facing very considerable headwinds. The property market, the retail market, the run on the banks that we have seen lately because of the liquidity crisis and the banks are all factors which make it more difficult and not less difficult for the Chinese to spend money abroad.
Vijay Gokhale
Of course, the silver lining is that their export growth targets have been substantially met and as we know it, sports have powered the Chinese Overseas direct invest as well as aid as well as grants, but in the current stressed economic situation, whether China can continue to put that sort of money abroad is questionable.
Vijay Gokhale
But in the short term, in any case aside from the funds it is also the image of China as a defender of the interests of the Third world, as a partner to the Third World, which feels that there are too many conditionalities that the West puts on it in return for giving money which resonates with the Third World.
Vijay Gokhale
So, in the short term we put their situation where China signs off on agreements to make big pledges of money that might take a little time to sanctify.
Vijay Gokhale
But in the meantime, a lot of diplomatic, goodwill, and political goodwill is gained by the Chinese.
Vijay Gokhale
So, I think we should be we should not simply go by the amount of money they put, but by the resonance that their message has in African capitals in Asian capitals and in Latin American capitals, and I think that is the key that we need to follow in the next 18 to 24 months or so.
Srinath
Uhm, no. China's activism in the recent months has Also met with certain kinds of responses from its potential adversaries. We saw that there was a second in person meeting of the QUAD which was held in Tokyo. I was wondering what your assessment of that particular summit was is the QUAD support moving away from a more bruiser kind of a political grouping to something which has a clearer focus in terms of what it wants to do vis a vis China.
Vijay Gokhale
Yeah, that's an excellent question Srinath, but before I answer that, I think we need to be clear that while some countries are concerned about China activism or a more assertive or even a more aggressive China, a large group of countries in what is called the Global South really don't get affected by China's behavior in quite the way that neighbors or some of its larger competitors get effected.
Vijay Gokhale
Therefore, the narrative we should not be carried away by the narrative that the recent aggressive or assertive Chinese policies have created a tidal wave of discomfort or unhappiness across the world that is simply not true.
Vijay Gokhale
Many countries still believe that China offers a viable economic, financial, and technological option to the West.
Vijay Gokhale
Now coming to QUAD of course, there is no doubt of the traction it has gained in the last 12 months.
Vijay Gokhale
After all, in just the last one year there have been 4 summits meetings, two of them in person and the sort of subjects that are being discussed in QUAD now as we can see from the latest summit statement, range from infrastructure and trade to space, cyber security, and even a regional economic arrangement.
Vijay Gokhale
Now, having said that, of course I should add that many of these ideas are still in the exploratory stage or in the formative stage?
Vijay Gokhale
We don't actually have an infrastructure plan that QUAD has put up as a sort of counter to the belt and Rd initiatives we don't have a structure to negotiate the terms and conditions of the IPEF the way in which our set is now a functioning regional economic arrangement.
Vijay Gokhale
So there is a way to go until these structures or systems evolve so that they can provide the Asia Pacific and the Indo Pacific with alternatives to the Chinese, the models.
Vijay Gokhale
But on the other hand, we have to say that there has been a good start in some key areas.
Vijay Gokhale
I would list health as one key area where a close to a billion doses of the COVID vaccine has been delivered in the region, and the four countries have pledged to help out with further health related assistance in order to ensure you know overall wellbeing.
Vijay Gokhale
The second I would say is in the maritime domain, and this new initiative, the Indo Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative, which will be used to initially combat illegal fishing, is something which is welcome because what you are putting into place is a system in the Indo Pacific in which countries collaborate to ensure that the economic security of all of them is protected using the technological capabilities of some of the larger countries which have the capacity.
Vijay Gokhale
And to that extent, this suggests a kind of cooperation between those who have the technology, willing to share it with those who don't, for the common good and for the common security of the region.
Vijay Gokhale
The third initiative, which I think is important, is in the space and cyber domains. These are new domains and a vast number of countries in the Indo Pacific not only don't have the capacity. They don't even have the domain knowledge in this area.
Vijay Gokhale
On the other hand, we are getting into a more and more digital world where even if we may not want to have it, financial transactions, commercial transactions, and the whole economic business of trade is all being digitalized.
Vijay Gokhale
And therefore, space and cyber become critical in ensuring the well-being and economic security of all countries, whether they are small island states in the Pacific or large continental countries like ours.
Vijay Gokhale
Now in these situations where four countries with core capacity, the United States, Japan, India, and Australia in these sectors can come together and collaborate in a way that, that helps the rest of the Indo Pacific community.
Vijay Gokhale
I think signals the intent of these four countries to deliver public goods not only in terms of hard security, but in terms of these advanced and critical technologies and I think that is a positive sign, so I would certainly say that these are three good initial steps taken by QUAD, but a lot needs to be done on other promises in the field of infrastructure in the field of regional trading arrangements and in in, in various other commitments that they have played to undertake at the summit in May.
Srinath
Ambassador Gokhale you spoke about The Indo Pacific Economic Forum, you know this is an idea that President Biden unveiled pretty much on the eve of the Tokyo Summit and India has signed up as well.
Srinath
Now the IPEF was perhaps a response to you know, criticism of the United States policy in the Asia - Pacific on the economic domain because they withdrew from the Transpacific Partnership earlier and then, you know now China is kind of come forward and it's become part of the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) as well.
Srinath
Now the IPEF we are told is not going to be a trading arrangement of any kind.
I'm just wondering what its economic muscle is going to be and then whether it is going to be able to do some of the things that you outlined like infrastructure, development assistance and so on.
Vijay Gokhale
Well, frankly, Srinath I don’t think anybody yet knows what the exact scope and modalities of the IPEF will be. Clearly it can't replace RCEP because our RCEP is already pretty much established in the region and China has a very dominant player, but also Japan and Australia who are a part of QUAD are not going to sabotage RCEP for the IPEF purpose.
Vijay Gokhale
So exactly what the IPEF will do is not clear. However, I think one of the key focus areas that they should be looking at is ensuring that competition in the Indo Pacific is on the basis of certain international internationally approved practices and policies.
Vijay Gokhale
To the extent that you can create what we all call as a level playing field and if the IPEF can act as a facilitator for that purpose, and even to some extent a watchdog to warn against the use of practices which are not part of the level playing field, we will actually be helping the smaller, more vulnerable, economically less developed economies in the region to have a chance at competing in the global marketplace, or at least in the Indo Pacific marketplace with the key advanced players. So that is 1 area where I think the IPEF can do a good job.
Vijay Gokhale
The second, of course, is how it get whether it can coordinate, uh, capacities that different countries have in a way in which it benefits other third country.
Vijay Gokhale
For instance, India doesn't necessarily have capital, but it has good human resources, and it has certain good practices as well.
Vijay Gokhale
Japan, on the other hand, has capital and technology, and so does United States.
Vijay Gokhale
How can we collaborate in such a way that their technology and capital and our human resources and technical skills can be combined?
Vijay Gokhale
And two, for instance helped the South Pacific Island states to develop certain aspects of their economy.
Vijay Gokhale
Now this is one of the main points that have been mentioned in the QUAD summit statement that the four countries will help to South Pacific economies and South Pacific countries to develop their own economy.
Vijay Gokhale
So this is where I think IPEF can act as a platform, but as I said, as of now the contours of the IPEF are not quite clear. And I think we will have to wait.
Vijay Gokhale
I have no doubts that working through, and officials are already discussing the shape and proof of this particular initiative.
Srinath
The United States has also, you know, taken a few other initiatives.
Srinath
You mentioned the AUKUS earlier, there is the new initiative in West Asia, called I2U2 I'm just trying to understand, you know what does the United States want to do by creating these overlapping networks of partnerships and so on I mean is it a web which is designed to contain Chinese influence, or is it going to become some kind of a cat's cradle?
Vijay Gokhale
Well, I think one thing is clear to me and that is the United States does not have the capability now to handle issues entirely by itself.
Vijay Gokhale
There are limitations on it for various reasons, including domestic and external and therefore the United States has been making an effort to build more partnerships in the region.
Vijay Gokhale
Now, whatever may be the objective of the United States, the other participating countries need not necessarily be completely aligned with those of objectives.
Vijay Gokhale
For instance, even in the case of QUAD, whereas the other three countries are treaty partners and allies of each other, India does not have a treaty with any of the three countries and is not an ally to any of them.
Vijay Gokhale
That does not, however, mean that we do not share common interests, and wherever we do so we partner with them in QUAD, wherever it is not possible to do so as we have seen, the United States has created new structures in particular AUKUS
Vijay Gokhale
In that context, from India's perspective, and I can only sort of look at my own country's perspective. Both the I2U2 and the QUAD are essentially efforts by India to increase its footprint in regions it considers vital to its security by establishing platforms that give it a wider reach and that bring partners who India can partner with and therefore, in a sense expand their influence in a much bigger way than if we were to go it alone. And that is the way I would look at it from the Indian perspective.
Vijay Gokhale
Now the American perspective may well be Containment of China, but from the Indian perspective I do not see how the I2U2 for instance has anything to do with China. If anything, it is driven by the current government's laser like focus on the gulf.
Vijay Gokhale
The current government has done substantial, has put in substantial efforts to build not just an economic relationship, but the security relationship with them as well.
Vijay Gokhale
Because we see the western Indian Ocean as part of our security framework and we see these countries now in the maritime domain as neighbors or near neighbors whether they are Oman or the UAE or Saudi Arabia, and therefore I think we are driven here by our interests first and foremost, not necessarily by American interests, or by the desire to contain China.
So, I would certainly not say that from the Indian perspective any of these platforms is driven by our desire to contain the Chinese.
Srinath
Sure, Ambassador Gokhale, I want to shift the focus a little bit towards the broader sort of geopolitics of the region, including the from ongoing Russian war against Ukraine and you know, ahead of the before Russia invaded Ukraine, the Russians and the Chinese had given a very lengthy joint statement which you had sort of put out very detailed analysis of.In which they said that you know there is a very strong and stable partnership and that nothing would sort of upset that particular equation. And it seems like that has held through at least through these months of the war that Russia has waged against Ukraine as well as the sanctions and other kinds of constraints they've been imposed on Russia. So, I'm just wondering what do you see, as the state of play between China and Russia today. If the war in Ukraine continues, will there be a difference? And I'd also like to have your thoughts on what all of this means for India.
Vijay Gokhale
So, I think the singular point of Chinese foreign policy if there was one dominating strategic objectives from 1949 until today if that has been to prevent States and Russia either in the Soviet Union form or in the form of the Russian Federation from coming together on the same platform against potentially against the people's Republic of China.
Vijay Gokhale
And therefore, Chinese foreign policy has always played the two major powers, or at least countries that were the two major powers until maybe 10 years ago of against each other in an effort to keep China secure and Chinese objectives achievable.
Vijay Gokhale
In that context, when the Chinese side believes that the United States has now become the existential threat, it makes perfect sense for them to ensure that Russia does not slip away from their moorings in any way, and therefore, from the year 2000 when President Putin became the President of Russia it has been the consistent effort of the Chinese to make that relationship stronger and more durable and more secure with each passing year. Now, having said that, I think the February 4, 2020, statement was a bit of an overreach and if one is to read the tea leaves then the movement of vice foreign minister Le Yu Chang from the Foreign Office to the state radio and Television Commission in a sense, indicates that at least one head has rolled as a result of this development.
Vijay Gokhale
Le Yu Chang was himself responsible for the drafting and steering of this statement and for defending it subsequently, after the 25th of February. So, I certainly think that there has been some angst in China over the extent to which that statement has put China in a more difficult position than it ought to have been in. That's the first point.
Vijay Gokhale
The second point is today China is bad is trying to deal with two situations which are not necessarily complementary and might be contradictory. On the one hand, the Chinese want to maintain a strong relationship with Russia and that is part of their strategic objectives, but on the other hand, the Chinese also understand that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is in the long run, unsustainable for them to justify, and that if they continue to be seen as siding with the Russians, they will pay a political cost of course, they're already doing so, but in the longer term, a possible economic and diplomatic cost and therefore, you know, in a way their situation is way more difficult than ours, because as the second most powerful country they have to reconcile these two somewhat give you considerable objectives and their effort in. Doing so at the moment has not had very great.
Vijay Gokhale
On the other hand, it is very clear that they will not abandon Russia. In the last few weeks, their foreign Ministry officials bring up to the top has reiterated that this is a strategic relationship and that they stand by Russia because they believe that Russia is being bullied by the United States by the European Union and by North American Treaty Organization, and they believe that if the Russians are allowed to be bullied us then the next target will be China.
Vijay Gokhale
Now, it has a huge implication. Of course, for the in the Pacific, and that implication is that, well, there are two implications. First, the Russian, the Chinese by spreading the view that it is need those efforts at pushing into what was Russian Backyard that prompted the Russian invasion of the Ukraine is in a sense, conveying a message in the Indo – Pacific that the QUAD which they called the Asian NATO if allowed to expand and challenge China's comfort level and space, might bring the same sort of retaliation, which may be detrimental to the full region, both in terms of security and economics. So that is one message that is being sent.
Vijay Gokhale
The other concern we ought to have is that the Chinese will expect a reciprocation from the Russians. Uh, because they have supported Russia against NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the United States in Europe and therefore, they will expect Russia to back them when they oppose the whole idea of the Indo Pacific as a as an outlook as a strategy as well as a first platform like the QUAD. And when Russia and China get together to raise doubts in the Indo Pacific then of course a larger number of countries might start hedging because they might, so the narrative might be far more palatable to them than if the Chinese were alone in this.
Vijay Gokhale
So, in both ways there will be significant implications for the Indo Pacific
And I think it behooves the QUAD countries but also many other countries which share the values and ideals of QUAD for instance, South Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia and so on. To make it clear. That there is no similarity between the situation is currently prevailing in Eastern Europe and the situation is currently prevailing in the Indo Pacific. There is absolutely no similarity, and therefore there should not be the concerns in one area need not be extrapolated in total to another.
Srinath
So, I'm like OK.
Ambassador Gokhale I have a final question which is that India and China are going to be meeting at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit later this month. Uhm, we know that India's position with Russia on the Ukraine war is at least partly shaped by the dynamic between India and China. I don't want to get too much into the India China bilateral relationship, but I'm just wondering what kind of an opportunity do you think this SCO summit is likely to sort of present the Chinese school clearly wants India, perhaps to engage more with them. They've already indicated in certain ways. I think, particularly in the run up to next year is, you know, BRICS summit, etc.
Srinath
The Chinese will want India to sort of warm up more, but clearly India own hands are tied because of the situation along the border with China has done nothing to restore status quo and so, I'm just wondering what could we reasonably expect out of this particular meeting?
Vijay Gokhale
Srinath the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a multilateral institution to that extent, the issues there are not related to India and China but to the region as a whole and if I may add in the past few years, there has been some dissonance between the Indian position and the positions of both Russia and China on certain issues and it is generally the accepted form in the SCO to reflect India's use separately from those of the rest.
Vijay Gokhale
I anticipate that on some issues this practice will also continue this year.
Vijay Gokhale
For instance, we can expect that on the Ukraine, the position that might be expressed by Russia, China, and possibly a few, if not all of these Central Asian countries is not a position that India would like to adopt because our position is clear and much more nuanced.
Vijay Gokhale
So, in those cases we can expect language to be found which will reflect the difference, and I don't think too much should be made of it.
Vijay Gokhale
As far as India, Russia relations are concerned, I think we have sort of found balance after the Ukraine invasion in our own national interest we are engaging with them economically, politically, and diplomatically, but at the same time I think it has been conveyed quite clearly even if privately that what is happening in the Ukraine is unsustainable and difficult for India to justify.
Vijay Gokhale
So, I would say that the really interesting developments would be those related to any possible interaction that might take place between the Heads of State and Government of India and China. Because this is the first time that both will meet in person if both them go to the summit. Them both of these sites.
Vijay Gokhale
Now, my understanding of the situation has always been that heads of state and government in such gatherings despite whatever differences you may have bilaterally do engage because there are larger interests at stake here, including those where we have a similar approach in the United Nations in the World Trade Organization and in other international institutions.
Vijay Gokhale
I would be surprised, therefore, if there is no bilateral meeting between the two.
Vijay Gokhale
Now the fact of the bilateral meeting itself would suggest that the two countries are acting in a mature and responsible fashion.
Vijay Gokhale
And I think that they have done so after June 2020 in a very mature and responsible fashion. I don't think it may mean that we have resolved the bilateral issues both the current impasse as well as any longer-term issues that we have, but I think in a sense it does help in bringing the temperature down and it also scope for the discussion to continue in the coming year and next year. There is not one but two occasions where the Chinese leader has to travel to India, both for BRICS and the G20 and it therefore buys space and time for a possible resolution of or of issues or amelioration of the situation such that we return to a more normal track of bilateral relations.
Vijay Gokhale
Having said that, Srinath, I think the Government of India has made his position quite clear which is that unless and until we find a viable solution with regard to the immediate crisis on the line of actual control in Western Ladakh the relationship will continue to be less than normalized.
Vijay Gokhale
I don't want to use the word abnormal, but less than normalized and I think that message is down across quite clearly to the China side.
Vijay Gokhale
The Chinese always do assess how consistent the country can be in its position, but I think by now they would have come to the conclusion that this position that the Government of India is taken is not a negotiating position it is in some sense a bottom line.
Vijay Gokhale
And the Chinese are a pragmatic people. They understand bottom lines.
They may not agree with bottom lines, but then they adjust strategy and tactics accordingly.
Vijay Gokhale
So, I think this will be if it happens if initial meeting happens, will be the meeting to watch in the SCO.
Vijay Gokhale
Although as I began by saying this is a multilateral institution, and therefore, the focus should not be bilateral, so. On that very sober no numbers to go claim.
Srinath
Thank you so much for joining us today.
Srinath
It was really a delight to speak to you and get your views on such a range of issues.
Vijay Gokhale
Thank you
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Srinath
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Srinath
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Srinath
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