In this episode of Interpreting India, Soner Cagaptay joins Rahul Bhatia to discuss Turkey’s role in shaping the Russia-Ukraine war, the rationale behind its actions, and how President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s electoral priorities impact Turkish foreign policy during the conflict. It further looks into Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of its involvement in regional conflicts, how Turkey’s drones are influencing its foreign policy, and finally, the implications of Turkey’s engagement with South Asia on India.
Lately, Turkey’s actions have come into the limelight. It notably delayed Sweden's and Finland’s memberships in NATO in exchange for fulfilling its own security demands. Meanwhile, it continues to supply drones and other weapons to Ukraine to resist Russian aggression while maintaining its relationship with Moscow at the same time. Turkey has further been involved in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as in civil wars in Syria and Libya. It has also sought to expand its influence in South Asia by deepening its multifaceted cooperation with Pakistan.
In this episode of Interpreting India, Soner Cagaptay joins Rahul Bhatia to discuss Turkey’s role in shaping the Russia-Ukraine war, the rationale behind its actions, and how President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s electoral priorities impact Turkish foreign policy during the conflict. It further looks into Turkey’s diplomatic efforts in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of its involvement in regional conflicts, how Turkey’s drones are influencing its foreign policy, and finally, the implications of Turkey’s engagement with South Asia on India.
--
Episode Contributors
Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media, including the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and The Atlantic. He has been a regular columnist for Hürriyet Daily News, Turkey's oldest and most influential English-language paper, and a contributor to CNN's Global Public Square blog. He appears regularly on Fox News, CNN, NPR, BBC, and CNN-Turk.
Rahul Bhatia is a research analyst with the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India. His research focuses on India’s borders and India’s foreign and defense policies.
--
Additional Reading
Erdogan's End Game by Soner Cagaptay
Turkey's Lethal Weapon by Soner Cagaptay and Rich Outzen
--
🎙️ Check out our podcast, Interpreting India available now on YouTube, Spotify, and iTunes!
Home: https://interpreting-india.simplecast.com/
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLeXQMWQXRkJXF71nDiX9LhlXiSkhR8JJT
Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/51yeOb8SimMIPe2KgIUQ8g
iTunes: https://pcr.apple.com/id1476357131
--
Carnegie India Socials:
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/carnegieindia/ (@CarnegieIndia)
Twitter: https://twitter.com/CarnegieIndia
Website: https://carnegieindia.org
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/CarnegieIndia/
Rahul Bhatia
Hello and welcome back to interpreting India. As the world looks hopefully to emerge from the shadow of the coronavirus pandemic, the first few months of 2022 have been defined by another variant of COVID-19, precarious geopolitical relations, and a rapidly evolving technological landscape. This season, we at Carnegie India are examining many of the challenges and opportunities that India will confront in the coming decade.
Rahul Bhatia
I am your host, Rahul Bhatia, and this week we are discussing Turkey’s geopolitical maneuvering in Europe, the Middle East and South Asia.
Rahul Bhatia
Off late, Turkey's actions have come into the limelight. It notably delayed Sweden and Finland's membership in NATO in exchange for fulfilling its own security demands. Meanwhile, it continues to supply drones and other weapons to Ukraine to resist Russian aggression, while maintaining its relationship with Moscow at the same time.
Rahul Bhatia
Turkey has further been involved in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as civil wars in Syria and Libya. It has also sought to expand its influence in South Asia by deepening its multifaceted cooperation with Pakistan.
Rahul Bhatia
In this episode of Interpreting India, we discussed Turkey's role in shaping the Russia-Ukraine war and the rationale behind its actions. We will further look into Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa through the lens of its involvement in regional conflicts. How Turkey’s drones are influencing its foreign policy and finally, what are the implications of Turkey's engagement with South Asia on India?
Rahul Bhatia
Joining us today to discuss this topic is Dr. Soner Cagaptay.
Rahul Bhatia
Soner Cagaptay is the Beyer Family fellow and director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish relations, Turkish domestic politics and Turkish nationalism, publishing in scholarly journals and major international print media, including the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, New York Times, Foreign Affairs and the Atlantic. He also appears regularly on broadcast media. His latest book, A Sultan in Autumn: Erdogan Faces Turkey's Uncontainable Forces, was published last year, in June.
Rahul Bhatia
Soner, welcome to Interpreting India.
Soner Cagaptay
It's a great pleasure to be with you, Rahul. Thanks for hosting me, I appreciate it!
Rahul Bhatia
If I could start off with a subject that has dominated the international landscape for the last six months, the war in Ukraine.
Rahul Bhatia
We have seen Turkey engaging not only with Russia and Ukraine in this conflict, but also with the EU, NATO, and the United States.
Rahul Bhatia
On the one hand, it condemned Russia for invading Ukraine but (on the other) it did not join the sanctions regime. It has also continued to supply Ukraine weapons, most notably drones, but at the same time it has maintained economic ties with Russia.
Rahul Bhatia
Could you explain the rationale behind Turkey's decision making in the conflict and for how long it can continue its balancing act, if I can put it that way?
Soner Cagaptay
I would say that Turkey's foreign policy is quite interesting to study. Turkey is basically a middle-sized power but it is a country that punches above its weight. It has been doing this because it has quite an effective military and also because it's playing different sides in global conflicts.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkish foreign policy, until the rise of President Erdogan’s Justice and Development AKP party, until at the very beginning of this century, was a foreign policy that was staunchly anchored in the West. Turkey, basically, sold itself as part of NATO family and was in accession talks with the EU, and would, often times, move lock and step with the United States.
Soner Cagaptay
That's not the case anymore.
Soner Cagaptay
President Erdogan, after coming to power, delivered quite phenomenal growth. For over a decade, Turkeys’ economy almost doubled in size, and, I think, that, together with Erdogan's ambitions to make Turkey a great power again meant that Turkey started to gradually drift away from its foreign policy of always moving in tandem with the United States and NATO and the West.
Soner Cagaptay
So now, what Turkey is doing, I think, for about ten years or so, it's been searching for, what I call, an autarchic foreign policy, standalone.
Soner Cagaptay
It still considers itself to be part of the West; it is still a NATO member; it is still courting close relations with EU countries. But it is doing what it wants to do, even if, at times, in conflict with the West. We saw this in Syria, where Turkey and the U.S. have diverging policies. And now, you also see this in the Ukraine war.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey’s take on Ukraine, no. 1 is that Ankara will do everything it can to make sure that Kyiv does not fall under Moscow’ rule.
Soner Cagaptay
This has a lot to do with Turkey’s view of the Black Sea and the security and strategic environment. There are only two large powers around the Black Sea, Turkey and Russia.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey sees all other Black Sea neighbors, including Ukraine, as necessary allies with which it can build a block against Russia, which is militarily superior power on the Black Sea.
Soner Cagaptay
So, Turkey has excellent ties with all its Black Sea neighbors other than Russia, of course. That includes Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova.
Soner Cagaptay
So militarily, Turkey supports Ukraine, provides it with drones and is on board. But economically, Turkey decided to not come on board with the sanctions targeting Russia and it has kept itself open for business with Russia.
Soner Cagaptay
That is a lot to do with, as I said earlier, Turkey's quest to be an autarchic power.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey is basically saying, I do not have to listen to the United States on every issue. I will only align with the U.S. where my interests align with the U.S. Otherwise, I'll do what I need to do. Enter President Erdogan. In Turkey, these days, so much is about Erdogan, specifically his plans to get re-elected in 2023 elections.
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan's popularity has been slipping lately. That has a lot to do with the lack of economic growth.
Soner Cagaptay
His bright side is that he delivered growth, lifted people out of poverty.
Soner Cagaptay
But now he's facing a challenge since 2018, when the Turkish economy went into recession for the first time.
Soner Cagaptay
The economy exited recession, but the macro indicators are not very good; inflation went from single digits to 70%, and, of course, the country's economic finances do not look to be in great shape.
Soner Cagaptay
So, what Erdogan wants to do is, he wants to open up the economy in a phenomenal way ahead of the elections. He wants foreign cash to flow into Turkey because he is trying to keep the lira stable.
Soner Cagaptay
And for that, he's saying, I will keep trade with Russia going.
Soner Cagaptay
And so, I think, Turkey is supporting Russian investment, Russian trade. And so, once again, it's a policy, I would say, as a result towards the war in Ukraine where Turkey is pro-Ukraine but not anti-Russia. Which is why, I think, it's a fascinating country to study.
Soner Cagaptay
One of the reasons I love writing and studying about Turkey is that I believe if countries could be vegetables, Turkey would the analytical onion.
Soner Cagaptay
The analytical onion because it does not have a core; it defies Manichean binarism and broad generalizations. And Ukraine policy is a case in point. Turkey is militarily supporting Ukraine but is economically friendly with Russia.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I would say, its policy is pro-Ukraine neutrality, using the analytical onion analogy here.
Rahul Bhatia
Wonderful! Would you say that this is more of a short-term thing because in the long term by assuming that Russia’s economy is going to be significantly impacted by the war, so Turkey would once again go on to prioritize relations with the EU and the West.
Soner Cagaptay
No, I think that Erdogan’s policy is going to be, basically, making sure that he is Russia's economic outlet to the world.
Soner Cagaptay
Recently Erdogan had a meeting with Russian leader, Putin, in Sochi, a Black Sea resort.
Soner Cagaptay
I always love to follow these meetings because a lot comes out of these secret meetings in which Erdogan and Putin meet.
Soner Cagaptay
I call these meetings two KGB, one Turk. Two KGB, meaning Putin and his translator. Erdogan is not allowed to bring his own translator, so he's the Turkey with two Russians and a lot of deals are made at those meetings.
Soner Cagaptay
So, looks like the last meeting produced an outcome where Turkey committed to pay some of the money it owes Russia for natural gas purchases in rubles.
Soner Cagaptay
That's good for Russia.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey also agreed to allow Russian tourists to use a Russian credit card system called Mir, as opposed to the American ones. So, Russians can now visit Turkey, and it is not a surprise that the number of Russians coming to Turkey is booming. The number of Russian companies established in Turkey is booming.
Soner Cagaptay
I think a lot of Russians from the upper middle-class families are buying homes in Turkey, kind of, to put their money away as safekeeping. Some are doing this to get Turkish citizenship. If you invest in more than $ 400,000 in Turkey, that gives you the right to become a citizen.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I would say Turkey has attracted, you know, billions of Russian investments. Billions of dollars of fresh investment are coming in.
Soner Cagaptay
More importantly, at the Sochi meeting, it looked like Putin decided to wire, maybe, $5 billion or more to Turkey.
Soner Cagaptay
This is in terms of payment for the nuclear power project that the Russians are building in Turkey called Akkuyu. But the power project has been built for many years now and it's not going to be finished soon. I would say that money is going to trickle down Turkey’ s economy and create a set temporary sense of relief.
Soner Cagaptay
And you know, Turkey is a middle-sized power. Its economy is less than a trillion dollars in size. So, $10 billion Russian money from here, $10 billion Russian money from there will make a difference.
Soner Cagaptay
Not only that, Turkey is also cultivating money now from the Persian Gulf.
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan had a big challenge when he launched this foreign policy about a decade ago to make Turkey a leader country by and through the leadership of Muslim majority societies. The first part of his vision was that Turkey would establish soft power across the Middle East.
Soner Cagaptay
That has not really happened.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey now has fewer friends and allies in the Middle East than ever before, including before everyone came to power.
Soner Cagaptay
Its only real ally is Qatar. It's also on friendly terms with Libya's internationally recognized government and the Iraqi Kurdish regions’ ruling party, Kurdistan Democratic Party. So, it has one country and two entities as its friends and allies in the Middle East.
Soner Cagaptay
Not a great record, but what Erdogan is doing now is trying to reset ties. We can discuss why these ties were not good or have fallen apart.
Soner Cagaptay
He's trying to reset ties with Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC members.
Soner Cagaptay
That effort worked successfully with the Emiratis. Erdogan also reached out to the Saudi Crown Prince. Turkey just reset with Israel. And gulf money is also flowing to Turkey. So, I think, Erdogan’s election platform for 2023 is to open the economy spectacularly well, perhaps, you know near a $100 billion flowing into Turkey.
Soner Cagaptay
Those of the Gulf and Russian investments coming in and a strong tourism season give the citizens a sense of prosperity and tell them, look, the world is going through a global crisis, there is the risk of World War III next door, Europeans will probably suffer from lack of Russian gas this winter; our Turkey won't because it has good ties with Russia.
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan will tell its citizens you are doing well while Europeans are freezing. Who do you really want to elect: a tried global leader or the opposition that has been trying for 20 years to oust me? Do you really want to try the unknown or do you want to go with the known and tried?
Soner Cagaptay
I think that's going to be his platform and I would say playing between the U.S., NATO, Russia and Arab countries is how Erdogan hopes to make it to the finishing line.
Rahul Bhatia
Okay. I will come back to the Middle East later on, but if I could just bring you back to the Russia-Ukraine war.
Rahul Bhatia
So, President Erdogan has offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine in the past, and Turkey played a key role in brokering a deal between Russia and Ukraine to allow the resumption of Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea.
Rahul Bhatia
Do you see a future mediation role for Turkey in this context?
Soner Cagaptay
Absolutely. I think that Erdogan’s election platform will have three agenda items. The first is going to say I have restored growth.
Soner Cagaptay
The second is going to say I have reset Turkey’s ties with all its neighbors. Never mind that under Erdogan the economy collapsed, under Erdogan Turkey’s ties with its neighbors collapsed. He's going to, basically, write the narrative as he likes. He can do it because he controls over 90% of the conventional media in Turkey. So, his narrative can become fact and reality.
Soner Cagaptay
He can basically say, vote for me because I have restored growth, I've restored ties with our neighbors.
Soner Cagaptay
But the third piece of his platform is going to be that he'll also say, look, I'm also a global leader. I'm the one who can bring Russia and Ukraine together.
Soner Cagaptay
And that is true. So far, the only agreement in which the Russians and Ukrainians have, kind of, you know, signed under the same deal since the beginning of the war is the grain corridor. And it's being executed with Erdogan’s intervention.
Soner Cagaptay
You know, everybody appreciates it because it alleviates the risk of global hunger. Even those who basically say, you know, be harder on Russia, be tough on Russia, won't object to this deal.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I think part of Erdogan’s game plan for the next six months is to bring the two leaders together at a negotiating table. If he can, of course, you know, have Russia and Ukraine agreed through some kind of a peace deal or a cease-fire under way to a peace deal, that makes him look so good internationally and also domestically.
Soner Cagaptay
It underlines his brand as a global leader versus all the other politicians who are trying to unseat him, who would look as local competitors.
Rahul Bhatia
Right!
Rahul Bhatia
And another aspect of the war in Ukraine was Finland and Sweden applying to join NATO in a move of historical significance. Turkey initially opposed the move, but withdrew its veto after being given some assurances.
Rahul Bhatia
Now, Turkey may have legitimate concerns over here, but its actions haven't been well received in Europe, to say the least, especially given that the expansion of NATO is a key western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Rahul Bhatia
How has Turkey’s opportunism impacted its long-term relationship with Europe?
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey, indeed, I would say has legitimate concerns regarding the existence of PKK networks in Sweden.
Soner Cagaptay
The PKK, also known as Kurdistan Workers Party, is a terror designated entity by NATO, so that means by Turkey and the U.S. but also, potentially, by Sweden if Sweden were to become an EU member.
Soner Cagaptay
Finland, I think, is the collateral damage of this process. There are no concerns regarding PKK networks there. But because Finland and Sweden are moving their accession processes in tandem, they got caught in the Turkish objection.
Soner Cagaptay
The issue here is that they were holding talks behind closed doors between NATO, Turkish and Swedish diplomats about how to address Turkeys' concerns. But President Erdogan decided to take these negotiations out, and he did it, I think, because he realized that there's something for him to gain here.
Soner Cagaptay
He's quite an astute politician. He knows how to win elections. He also now knows how to use international developments to his advantage to create this brand for himself as a strongman leader globally. That makes Turkey proud, right?
Soner Cagaptay
So, he decided to raise objections to Swedish exception. Knowing that Turkey is a member of NATO and NATO decides on unanimity. So, if Turkey vetoes it doesn't matter if everybody else agrees to Swedish exception; it will not happen.
Soner Cagaptay
He knows that at the end of the day the Swedes will have to make some concessions to Turkey on the PKK issue. The Swedes may not meet all of Turkey's demands regarding PKK networks but they'll have to meet some of them.
Soner Cagaptay
Again, Erdogan controls a large chunk of the media in Turkey. Even if these are minor and not necessarily major concessions, Erdogan can write a narrative of complete victory. As I say, he can basically say this is the reverse of the Ottoman defeat at Vienna. You know, I have had the Europeans go down on their knees, beg for us to come in; they had to agree to our terms.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey recently approved the first stage of Swedish accession after objecting to it. That came after a phone call from President Biden to President Erdogan.
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan must have been extremely happy since he came to power. He's been craving for interaction with Biden.
Soner Cagaptay
It has a lot to do with the fact that notwithstanding Erdogan’s efforts in the last decade or so to change Turkey’s identity at home from a secular one to an Islamic one and internationally from a European one to a Middle Eastern one, I would say, these efforts—we can discuss that—have not been completely successful.
Soner Cagaptay
Notwithstanding his efforts to change Turkey’s identity to an Islamic one and a Middle Eastern one there is a fact that Turkey’s economy is completely integrated with the West, with the European Union, which is Turkey’s key trading partner and a major source of foreign direct investment coming to Turkey, and also with the U.S. The U.S. is not a key economic player in Turkey, but the U.S.-Turkish ties are largely symbolic.
Soner Cagaptay
I think it was Bismarck who once said that Turkey is East if you come from the West and West if you come from the East.
Soner Cagaptay
When investors are about to put money into Turkey, they don't just look at the macro indicators; they also worry about Turkey’s direction. They want to know that it is not going away leaving the West, right?
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan wants to cultivate good ties with Biden in order to create a narrative for the markets that Turkey is okay and it is not going anywhere. You can invest money in it.
Soner Cagaptay
Again, this is part of his game to reopen the economy strongly. Together with Russian and Gulf money and tourism revenues, he wants Western financial inflows, from US and from Europe. Those inflows won't come in if the Turkish ties don't look good.
Soner Cagaptay
So, Erdogan used the crisis over Swede accession to NATO to procure a phone call from Biden. It worked! Biden actually met Erdogan at the NATO summit. And, of course, after that Erdogan said yes.
Soner Cagaptay
But it's not final until its final. Swedish accession to NATO will be decided and finalized at NATO's next year Summit in Lithuania in May. Guess what? Turkey has elections in June, just about a month after that.
Soner Cagaptay
I think that alone will squeeze this until the last moment. Maybe we'll see other crisis ahead of Swedish accession. Turkey will raise new objections. The Swedes will have to meet some more demands. Again, they won't be meeting all of Turkey’s demands, doesn't matter.
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan will take these concessions and run and say, hey, this is the reverse of Ottoman defeat at Vienna; I made Turkey and Turks proud again.
Soner Cagaptay
Especially if this happens a month before Turkish elections, that Swedes make new concessions, it makes him look very good.
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan benefits from his strongman image globally in domestic politics, and, I think, this is the linkage that he has established between Turkey’s very legitimate demands and concerns regarding PKK networks in Sweden and his own re-election and prospects.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I would say, keep watching for new crises regarding Swedish and Finnish accession to NATO later this year, but even more so ahead of Turkish elections that are overlapping with NATO’s next summit in Lithuania in May 2023.
Rahul Bhatia
Right!
Rahul Bhatia
So, it seems like Erdogan is mainly focused on winning re-election and not so much about the long term. Is that correct to say?
Soner Cagaptay
Yeah, I would say that's not unfair. Erdogan basically is only worried about, kind of, opening up the economy strongly. Macro indicators doesn’t look good, but he wants to bring a large amount of cash from the Gulf and from Russia.
Soner Cagaptay
For him, these elections are all about survival. He has, until recently, won over a dozen nationwide elections on a platform of strong economic growth. And he also has a dark side. He's a nativist and populist politician; he demonizes, brutalizes and cracks down on demographics unlikely to vote for him.
Soner Cagaptay
While he has a base that loves him, he also has an opposition that loathes him.
Soner Cagaptay
And the problem of Turkey is that there is such deep societal polarization that there's almost nobody is left in the middle. So, for Erdogan, losing is not an option. He fears that he will be prosecuted by his opponents if he loses elections. He will do everything to win.
Soner Cagaptay
I think for him, in the short term, winning is more important than long term economic and political stability. He's saying I'll cross that bridge when I get to it, let me win elections first and will do everything that is necessary to that end.
Rahul Bhatia
Right.
Rahul Bhatia
If I could now pivot to the Middle East and North Africa as well.
Rahul Bhatia
The war between Ukraine and Russia is not the only conflict in which Turkey has been involved. It has played an important role in training and arming Azeri forces in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It threw weight behind the internationally recognized government in the Libyan civil war board and remains vital player in Syria.
Rahul Bhatia
How do these conflicts feature in Turkey’s larger policy in the region?
Soner Cagaptay
I would say, Turkey’s active engagement in these conflicts in Libya and in South Caucasus are part of a foreign policy pivot under Erdogan.
Soner Cagaptay
I would say, Erdogan, who has been in power for two decades now, has had a number of pivots. About a decade after coming to power and taking stock with strong economic growth in the country, he decided to follow a more autarkic foreign policy.
Soner Cagaptay
He said, I'll make Turkey a standalone great power by and through leadership of Muslim; I'll start with the Middle East.
Soner Cagaptay
So, he engaged Turkey as an active participant in Arab uprisings. He thought that he could shape the outcome of these uprisings, starting with Egypt. And then, of course, have friendly governments come to power. Then Turkey’s influence would multiply. That did not work out so well.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey supported Muslim Brotherhood and rose to power in Egypt quite fast. But the brotherhood fell from power in Egypt even faster.
Soner Cagaptay
The new government in Egypt by General Sisi now sees the brotherhood as its greatest domestic and external threat. The Brotherhood enjoyed refuge in Turkey until recently, and so that's why Turkish-Egyptian ties have collapsed.
Soner Cagaptay
Together with this, Turkey has ties with Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, members and Israel, which generally oppose the brotherhood. In the case of Israel, it's the Hamas which is the brotherhood of Palestinian extension. These countries in GCC, Saudi Arabia, UAE and their allies, and monarchies across the region, Jordan and Israel, have also stepped in. Now, Turkey is facing the largest alliance of anti-Turkey powers in the Middle East.
Soner Cagaptay
So then came Erdogan’s second pivot. He said fine, if I cannot obtain diplomatic clout, then I will make up for missing diplomatic clout with sheer military power.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey’s military made an amazing comeback from the 2016 coup attempt. Only six weeks after the coup, Turkey carried out an incursion into Syria to go after the Kurdish group called People Protection Forces, YPG. It's an offshoot of Kurdistan Workers Party, a terror-designated entity.
Soner Cagaptay
The YPG has been a partner to the US and Syria to fight ISIS. Turkey was never happy about this policy. It kind of gave it grudging approval saying, fine, we don't like it but you can work with the YPG so long as it helps defeat ISIS.
Soner Cagaptay
After ISIS was defeated, Turkey went to the United States and said, you told us this policy was transactional and temporary, but it looks like your relationship with the YPG is becoming, sort of, an open-ended endorsement. The US asked for more patience, but at this point, Turkey decided to, kind of, go on its own into Syria. That was the incursion that came six weeks after the coup attempt. The military has since carried out other three incursions into Syria, all of which were aimed at the YPG. Not only that, Erdogan, is also kind of extending its wings in areas beyond its borders, in Libya, across the Mediterranean, in South Caucasus, in the Indian Ocean for the first time since the Ottomans in 16th century.
Soner Cagaptay
The largest Turkish mission in the world is in Mogadishu and the largest embassy in Mogadishu is the Turkish embassy. Turkey has a training mission and a military base there. It is building a military base in Qatar. This is quite an outreach.
Soner Cagaptay
I think what Turkey is doing is it is making up for missing diplomatic power with sheer military power. Its military is quite effective; it is second largest in NATO, after the U.S., and one of the most modern. It has drones, which are amazing.
Soner Cagaptay
They do a good job, for instance, in helping Ukraine deny the Russians air superiority. They have also helped the Azeris win the war against Armenian in Nagorno-Karabakh. Most recently, the government in Tripoli stop the advance of General Haftar, backed by UAE and Egypt, against the Libyan capital of Tripoli.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I would say, Turkey can punch above its weight because it has an effective military. Also, it has a native arms industry that makes these drones.
Soner Cagaptay
I was told by a friend that the ammunitions for a Turkish drone can cost less than a U.S. drone itself. So, these are not only effective but also cost effective. They're cheap and that is why many countries are trying to procure them.
Soner Cagaptay
I just tweeted this morning a map showing countries that own Turkish drones, for our listeners in India.
Soner Cagaptay
That's interesting, of course.
Soner Cagaptay
Pakistan has acquired them and so has Bangladesh. A number of other countries are trying to acquire them in Africa, Eastern Europe, Poland and Baltics, and Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Serbia. So clearly this is an effort that goes beyond the Muslim majority countries. It's this new sign of a Turkey rising militarily.
Soner Cagaptay
Of course, all that depends on the economy. Economy is Erdogan’s Achilles heel, right? If the economy tanks, Turkey, you know, won't be able to flex its muscle and engage in these costly endeavors overseas. And Erdogan will lose elections.
Soner Cagaptay
If the economy recovers, Turkey will continue to flex its muscles globally. And Erdogan, of course, will win the election. So much hinges on how the economy in Turkey looks in, let's say, six months to a year.
Rahul Bhatia
Right.
Rahul Bhatia
Could I ask you a little bit to elaborate on how drones are, sort of, shaping Turkey’s foreign policy, especially as you mentioned it's courting several low- and middle-income countries to sell them, and they've, obviously, been pretty effective in conflicts throughout the region.
Soner Cagaptay
So, Turkey’s drone policy has two aspects. One is it is selling its drones to allies, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Libya’s Tripoli government.
Soner Cagaptay
And second, it is selling it to countries it wants to court as allies, you know, like Serbia, Bulgaria, Poland, the Baltics, and East European NATO countries, all of which are aligned with Turkey in the case of Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Soner Cagaptay
It's not an accident that all of Russia's neighbors from Finland and the north and the Turkey in the South are united in this effort to oppose Russia and Ukraine.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I think, the drone policy is helping Turkey boost existing alliances and build new ones.
Rahul Bhatia
Coming to one of Turkey's customers, Pakistan. Turkey and Pakistan have expanded defense ties of late. Turkey is a major arms supplier to Pakistan, including warships. Recently, President Erdogan stated that Turkey would provide all support needed to strengthen Pakistan military infrastructure.
Rahul Bhatia
What is the scope of this strategic partnership between Pakistan and Turkey?
Soner Cagaptay
I would say Turkish-Pakistani participation in the strategic sense is quite significant. Together with the U.S. with which Turkey is historic ties, Azerbaijan with which Turkey has ethnic and close political ties, and South Korea, whom Turkey went to support against communism in the 1950s Korean War.
Soner Cagaptay
Pakistan is among, I would say, the quartet of countries considered to be Turkey’s closest allies.
Soner Cagaptay
Why? This has a lot to do with history.
Soner Cagaptay
As an historian of late Ottoman Empire and 20th century Turkey, I am always fascinated by the strength of ties not only between Turkey and Pakistan but also South Asian Muslims in general.
Soner Cagaptay
It has a lot to do with the late Ottoman history in the 19th century.
Soner Cagaptay
Sometimes, I have friends who jokingly ask me, Soner, how would you define the borders of the Middle East?
Soner Cagaptay
And I tell them, look, if you go east of Turkey and start walking, the first time you run into a country in which Muslims like Turks again, you're not in the Middle East anymore. And that country is Pakistan.
Soner Cagaptay
This again goes back to 19th century, not just for Pakistan for but South Asian Muslims in general.
Soner Cagaptay
The Ottoman Empire’s late Sultan, Abdul Hamid II, was a Sultan with a vision. This Sultan realized that the empire was weak. He was autocratic, but also a modernizing Sultan, someone with two faces. He also wanted to make the Ottoman state more powerful.
Soner Cagaptay
At the time, the Ottomans faced two global adversaries: the British Empire and the Russian Empire.
Soner Cagaptay
So, Abdul Hamid II, in the late 19th century, sent emissaries as the caliph to Indian and British Muslims and even to South Africa to, kind of, rally support for Istanbul and Ottoman Empire again among them.
Soner Cagaptay
The appeal worked. The Ottomans were able to build soft power across Central Asia with Turkic Muslims and also among the subcontinent Muslims. So powerful (was its soft power in the subcontinent) that at the end of World War I, when Turkey was invaded and occupied by the Brits and the Allies, the largest support to Turkey came from a fund-raising campaign among India’s Muslims at the time.
Soner Cagaptay
People thought that they were going to help liberate the caliphate from British occupation.
Soner Cagaptay
Ataturk took their money, bought airplanes from Communist Russia, helped use these to defeat invading Greek armies and their allies by proxy, the British, liberated a Turkey, and, of course, then he abolished the Caliphate.
Soner Cagaptay
I would say to the great disappointment of the fund-raising campaign, which thought it was helping sustain the caliphate. But Ataturk pursued his secularizing reforms.
Soner Cagaptay
But the take-away is that there is this deep historic empathy, I would say, among many Muslims, not only Pakistan, but in India and South Asia in general towards Turkey, and that translated into strongly pro-Pakistani sentiments after the Partition. Turkey became Pakistan's one of best allies and Pakistan reciprocated to the extent that Pakistan is among the among the very few countries with which Turkey deals with anybody in power. If the regime changes, if there is a coup, it doesn't matter. Turkey behaves as if nothing has shifted in their relationship.
Soner Cagaptay
This just shows that this is a state-to-state relationship and not a leader-to-leader one.
Soner Cagaptay
I would say similarly, of course, for Azerbaijan, with which Turkey has good ties.
Soner Cagaptay
It is, therefore, not a surprise that Turkey and Azerbaijan recently have invited Pakistan to a forum where the three countries are now, you know, trying to bring together a closer cooperation in many fields.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I would say, this is, probably, a permanent of Turkish foreign policy. It is not something that Erdogan created and not something that 20th century Turkey created. I think it goes back to Sultan Abdul Hamid II. It also goes back to the independence movement in South Asia, in British India. And of course, I think, not all Indian Muslims fundraised in order to sustain the caliphate. Some of them just wanted to, you know, teach them a good lesson, if not in India than in Istanbul. And they were successful.
Soner Cagaptay
I think that history to this day informs Turkey’s sympathy for Muslims in South Asia in general. It also explains why Turkey and Pakistan have such good ties.
Soner Cagaptay
And I think for Pakistan, of course, having a friend inside NATO, having a large Muslim country support it is quite valuable.
Rahul Bhatia
I think it's interesting you say this because, on the one hand, it seems that Turkey is courting investment and (on the other hand) it looks like Pakistan is also quoting Turkish investment.
Rahul Bhatia
Recently, Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif showed a willingness to expand the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, or CPEC, to include Turkey.
Rahul Bhatia
So, my question is, how can Turkey actually contribute to CPEC? And given the situation of the Turkish economy, can Ankara actually make a meaningful economic commitment to CPEC?
Soner Cagaptay
So, I would say, while Turkish-Pakistani ties are excellent, Turkish-Chinese sides are not.
Soner Cagaptay
Whenever there's a triad that includes Turkey, China, and Pakistan, I'm skeptical about it.
Soner Cagaptay
This is a lot to do with the fact that Turkey happens to be the center of the Uyghur diaspora globally.
Soner Cagaptay
You know, East Turkistan, Xinjiang, a Chinese province, was a vassal state of China until the communist revolution. At the time of the Communist revolution, this area was incorporated into China, fell under complete rule, and its ruling elites, Uyghurs, the Khans and their descendants fled to Turkey.
Soner Cagaptay
This was a time of Turkey's entry into NATO. Turkey was a staunch U.S. ally. Of course, it was more than happy to receive political elites fleeing communist China. These political elites were also Turkish elites, related to Turks through language. Uyghur and Turkish are related languages, and there a lot of historic and cultural ties between Uyghurs and Turks. So, Turkey then became the center of Uyghur diaspora.
Soner Cagaptay
Other hubs of this diaspora have formed in Germany and the U.S., in Northern Virginia, near Washington DC. But Turkey still is the largest and also the historic center of the rigor opposition to China.
Soner Cagaptay
The Chinese know that.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey has tried to play nice with China. Again, Erdogan cultivated, you know, Chinese soft loans to build metro lines and infrastructure projects.
Soner Cagaptay
He was trying to restore economic growth through mega projects until recently. He also tried to secure a swap line with the Chinese Central Bank.
Soner Cagaptay
The Chinese have not reciprocated to any of these overtures because although Turkey has been completely quiet on what's happening in Xinjiang, the Chinese know that, notwithstanding Ankara’s quiet policy, Uyghurs are in Turkey. Turkey is the hub of this diaspora globally.
Soner Cagaptay
So, I think China really does not appreciate Turkey's position on this issue and has stayed away from it. So, I would say any tirade where Turkey, China and Pakistan are together, it is probably not a flourishing one.
Soner Cagaptay
While Turkey and Pakistan get along well and Pakistan and China get along well, Turkey and China do not get along well.
Rahul Bhatia
And what would be the scope is sort of Turkish investment in Pakistan bilaterally?
Soner Cagaptay
I would say much of the investment is in infrastructure projects. I think this is, kind of, how Erdogan is also hoping to boost economic growth, right? He wants to attract investment and cash inflows. Turkey is also going through a strong tourism season.
Soner Cagaptay
But Turkey’s, I would say, greatest export other than cars is its construction industry.
Soner Cagaptay
I think again, maybe, you can explain this through Ottoman history.
Soner Cagaptay
As a historian of the Ottomans, I'm fascinated that, you know, the Ottomans did not produce a lot of great thinkers, writers, and playwriters, but they produced a lot of great architects. The many mosques, structures and bridges of Istanbul and other parts of the Ottoman Empire are a testimony to that.
Soner Cagaptay
I would say the most famous Ottoman civilian other than a Sultan is the Ottoman architect known as Mimar Sinan. Sinan, the architect. It's not an accident, of course, that the most well-known Ottoman civilian is an architect.
Soner Cagaptay
I think the legacy of that is that to this day, Turkey’s construction companies are its greatest export in terms of services.
Soner Cagaptay
They will play a big role in Ukraine's reconstruction when there's a ceasefire. This will help Erdogan because many of the large construction companies are linked politically to the Turkish president and they kind of create a spindle effect, right?
Soner Cagaptay
They get big contracts from the government and then they, of course, hand out smaller contracts to their supporters. That money trickles down to the electorate.
Soner Cagaptay
So, there's this patronage mechanism which works really well, and I think Pakistan is also part of that.
Soner Cagaptay
I see Turkey building highways infrastructure projects. I would not be surprised—I haven't looked it up—if these projects are mostly given to, what I call, the five sisters, the five large construction companies linked to President Erdogan from where, of course, the money trickles down to the electorate.
Rahul Bhatia
My final question to you. In 2019, Turkey announced the Asia Anew initiative to enhance its ties with the continent. This would naturally entail expanding its diplomatic footprint in South Asia. What is Turkey's capacity to actually expand diplomatic footprint in South Asia, and what does this mean for India?
Soner Cagaptay
Turkey has been expanding its diplomatic footprint for over a decade now. Again, this is in line with President Erdogan's foreign policy of becoming a global player—a regional player first and then a global player next.
Soner Cagaptay
You know, a number of Turkish missions have multiplied many times over, for instance across Africa.
Soner Cagaptay
When Erdogan came to power Turkey had just about a dozen missions across the continent, more than half of them in North Africa, including the Mediterranean, a region with which Turkey has historic ties because these areas were controlled by the Ottomans.
Soner Cagaptay
So, Turkey had just around half a dozen missions across sub-Saharan Africa when Erdogan came to power. Now that's nearly 50 of them. That means an embassy almost in every African capital, and sometimes other missions and councils across.
Soner Cagaptay
The effort is multiplying in Latin America, not as significant in South Asia, I would say. And again, I would say, that it has a lot to do with the fact that while Turkish-Pakistani relations are excellent, you can't say the same for Turkish-Indian ties. But I would say Turkey is going to make these efforts to broaden its diplomatic presence.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkish diplomatic presence always comes with the presence of Turkish Airlines, which, I think, is Turkey’s most known global brand after Erdogan.
Soner Cagaptay
Erdogan is a name everybody knows. Everybody even knows how to spell his name.
Soner Cagaptay
Turkish Airlines is a close second. It now flies to more destinations than any other airline in the world. It actually flies to more destinations in Africa than, you know, the former colonial overlord of much of the continent.
Soner Cagaptay
I think all these efforts are promising for Turkey will be sustained only if the economy remains strong. So, the economy is not only Erdogan’s Achilles heel, he will not be able to win the next elections, however autocratic he is, unless he delivers strong economic growth.
Soner Cagaptay
Economy is Turkey’s Achilles heel.
Soner Cagaptay
The economy is strong. Turkey will continue to extend its wings and fly globally. If not, it will have to come down to earth.
Rahul Bhatia
Soner, thank you so much for this very informative discussion!
Soner Cagaptay
Thanks for hosting me. It was great to be with you. I appreciate it!
Rahul Bhatia
We'll be back in two weeks with a new episode.
Rahul Bhatia
To make sure you don't miss it, be sure to subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Stitcher, or wherever you get your podcasts. To learn more about our research and team, you can visit carnegieindia.org. You can also find us on social media on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram.
Thank you for listening, and see you next time!